Does asymmetric information cause the home equity bias? by Bravo-Ortega, Claudio









The home equity bias is one of the many puzzles existing in international ﬁnance. This
puzzle is characterized by the concentration of domestic equity in any investor’s portfolio, which
is in contradiction with the benchmark of full diversiﬁcation in a world mutual fund. Based on
Admati’s (1985) and Gehrig’s (1993) noisy rational expectation models, this paper attempts to
explain the eﬀect of asymmetric information in the home equity bias puzzle. While asymmetric
information helps to explain the puzzle for the case of one domestic and one foreign equity,
this result relies on very restrictive assumptions. Using a model with one domestic asset and
two foreign assets, I illustrate that asymmetries of information are also consistent with home
equity bias reversals. One proposition generalizes these results. Simulations corroborate the
main theoretical predictions of the model presented in this paper.
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The lack of international diversiﬁcation in the portfolios of investors all around the world
is a well documented fact and has been termed the home equity bias puzzle. This lack of
diversiﬁcation is revealed in the high concentration in domestic equity found in any investor’s
portfolio around the globe. The benchmark result establishes that investors throughout the
world should hold the same diversiﬁed portfolio of stocks, equivalent to holding a share of
a world market mutual fund.1 Interestingly, this lack of diversiﬁcation is not restricted to
international portfolio allocation. There is recent evidence that shows that people tend to
invest in the companies in which they are currently employed. In this manner part of their
ﬁnancial assets would be highly correlated with their human capital, 2 thereby reducing
their portfolio diversiﬁcation. Before studying what can explain the home equity bias, it
is important to know how big are the foregone gains of risk diversiﬁcation? Lewis (2000)
shows that the estimated gains that are based on stock returns are signiﬁcantly higher than
estimates from consumption-based models. Using stock returns the gains range from 20%
to 100% of permanent consumption, while in consumption based models, as in Cole and
Obstfeld (1991), gains would range from 0.04% to 5.6%. This paper attempts to shed light
on the role of asymmetries of information in generating the home equity bias by imposing
the simplest possible informational structure on Admati’s (1985) multi-asset model of noisy
rational expectations.
The hypotheses that attempt to explain the home equity bias have focused empirically on
the impact of asymmetries of information between domestic and foreign investors (proxied by
distance, number of foreign investment banks, newspapers, phone calls), and on transaction
costs. However, there have been few theoretical models explaining the relationship between
asymmetric information and home equity bias. Brenan and Cao (1997) study the impact of
asymmetries of information in international portfolio investment ﬂows, while Gehrig (1993)
shows that, for the case of one domestic and one foreign asset, asymmetries of information
can explain the home bias.
In Gehrig’s model, domestic and foreign assets’ signals are uncorrelated, and domestic
investors perceive foreign assets’ signals with larger variance than foreign investors. Analo-
gously, foreign investors perceive domestic assets’ signals with larger variance than domestic
investors. In this paper I show that by relaxing Gehrig’s conditions, the existence of the
home bias cannot be guaranteed. In my model the intuition can be derived from the CAPM
1For a derivation of this result see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996).
2Heaton and Lucas (2000) and Benartzi (2001).
1and the concepts of good and bad hedge that are extended to an informational framework by
using the fact that the demands for assets are linear in prices and signals.3 Assets’ signals
can increase or decrease the demands for assets over a baseline level conditional on prices.
On the other hand, the increase in the signals’ variance reduces the ﬂuctuations in the de-
mands. In this manner, domestic investors’ demand for foreign assets decreases (due to the
higher variance of the signals) relative to that of foreign investors for the case in which in-
formation increases the demand. Analogously, domestic investors demand more (due to the
higher variance of the signals) of the foreign asset when information decreases the demand
for assets. The same happens with the demands for domestic assets.
In the next section I brieﬂy review the literature, while in the following section I introduce
Admati’s (1985) model. In the third section I apply the model to the case of two and three
assets, and present simulations of the model. The fourth section concludes.
2 Literature Review
What can account for the observed lack of international risk diversiﬁcation? Lewis (1999)
considers three main explanations for the bias. The ﬁrst postulates that home assets may
provide better hedges against home country speciﬁc risks. The second suggests that the
costs of diversiﬁcation may outweigh the gains. The third explanation states that there are
statistical measurement problems that imply there is no real home bias. Another leading
explanation is based in the Salter-Swan traded-non-traded goods dichotomy. In this model
investors hold a globally diversiﬁed portfolio of traded industries. But non-traded industries
are held entirely domestically. More recently and in the same spirit, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(2000) explore the consequences of introducing trade costs. They show that under plausible
assumptions this is enough for generating a very high and realistic level of home portfolio bias.
Finally, Gehrig (1993) and Brenan and Cao (1997) postulate asymmetries of information as
the main determinant of the home equity bias. Recently Michaelides (2004) presents a
model in which he studies the impact of “small informational costs”, however these costs
just correspond to transaction costs and do not follow the approach of Verrechia (1982)
whose approach corresponds indeed to modeling the costs of acquiring information.
The empirical literature has built an interesting set of stylized facts that complement the
theoretical explanations for the puzzle. In what follows I brieﬂy describe the main empirical
results found in the literature.
3I consider as good hedge those assets that at the optimum should be bought in positive amounts, and
bad hedge those assets that at the optimum should be bought in negative amounts.
2Kang and Stulz (1997) ﬁnd evidence for Japan in which foreign investments are skewed
toward equities of large ﬁrms, for which it is believed more information is readily available.
The Treasury Department (1998) also conﬁrms this result for the case of the US. In the same
spirit, Portes and Rey (2001) and Portes, Rey and Oh (2001) provide evidence that, what
they call, information ﬂows are important in cross-country equity ﬂows. They ﬁnd that gross
transaction ﬂows depend on market size on both the destination and origin country, as well
as transaction costs, and distance. They control their estimates by a wide set of variables as
language, currency, telephone traﬃc, number of bank branches and inside trading. Regarding
the role of information they postulate that distance proxies some information costs, and that
the number of phone calls, number of bank branches and inside trading would account by
the eﬀect of informational asymmetries.
Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004) ﬁnd that US holdings on foreign equities are posi-
tively related to the share of the foreign country equity (directly or as American Depositary
Receipts) listed on US exchanges. They relate this result to the fact that foreign ﬁrms that
are listed in the US stock market are forced to provide standardized and credible ﬁnancial
information, reducing informational costs and hence asymmetries of information. This result
is consistent with the previous ﬁnding of Kang and Stulz (1997), who establish that in the
case of Japanese ﬁrms, those with ADR have more foreign ownership, although this fact was
true even before the emergence of ADR’s. Along these lines, Faruquee et al. (2003) ﬁnd
in their empirical results that market size, transaction costs and “information asymmetries”
(measured by what they name information costs that include: distance, language and phone
lines) are major determinants of cross border portfolio choice.
Regarding local experiences, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) ﬁnd that, in the US, investment
made by mutual funds also shows geographical bias. This result suggest that asymmetric in-
formation or the diﬀusion of information between local and non-local investors may inﬂuence
investment decisions. By the same token, Hau (1999) using German data ﬁnds evidence of in-
formational advantage for investors located close to the headquarters of the traded company
in high frequency trade (intra-day).
But asymmetric information may not show up just as home equity bias. Hau (1999) also
shows that foreign investors make lower proﬁts in the German Stock market. Consistent with
this result he ﬁnds weak evidence that German-speaking traders outperform non-German-
speaking traders.
The current state of the empirical literature has not clearly diﬀerentiated between the
roles of transaction costs and information acquisition costs. However, the existence of in-
3formation acquisition costs should imply asymmetries of information. Therefore, it is ﬁrst
needed to study whether asymmetries of information are consistent with the home equity
bias, and then to study whether information costs may have an impact on it. From a theo-
retical perspective the only paper I am aware of in which information acquisition costs are
treated separately is Verrechia (1982).
3 Admati’s Model Modiﬁed
There is a continuum of agents distributed evenly between domestic and foreign investors.
The index ± 2 ∆ ´ [0; 1
2] counts the domestic population, while the index ' 2 Φ ´ [1
2;1]
is used for the foreign population. The agents trade in the ﬁrst period and consume in the
second. Each agent invests his initial wealth Woi;i 2 ∆ [ Φ between a riskless asset and n
risky assets, m of which are domestic. The riskless asset pays R units and the risky assets
pay ˜ F units of the single consumption good, with the riskless asset taken as numeraire.
Take the ﬁrst m components corresponding to the returns of the domestic equities and the
remaining (n ¡ m) to the foreign equities. Let ˜ P be the price vector of the risky assets, ˜ Yi
the signal received by individual i regarding the assets’ returns. Therefore, we can express
the demand for assets as Di( ˜ P; ˜ Yi) : <n £ <n 7! <n the demand vector for agent i:
Each agent maximizes Ei[¡exp((W0iR + D0
i( ˜ F ¡ R ˜ P))=½i)] conditional on his private
information given by signal ˜ Yi which is correlated with ˜ F and the equilibrium price vector
˜ P: The utility function has constant absolute risk aversion. For the sake of simplicity assume
that the distribution of the risk aversion coeﬃcients, ½i; in the foreign and domestic country
are the same, moreover these distributions are independent of any random variable in the
model. I will assume each domestic investor has a twin in the foreign country that has the
same risk aversion and that perceives a signal vector i.i.d. I use this assumption in order to
be able to compare the demand for assets between investors of the two countries. In this
manner there is no diﬀerence in the demands due to diﬀerent risk aversion coeﬃcients.
The rational expectations hypothesis implies that each agent knows the joint normal
distribution followed by ˜ F; ˜ Yi; and ˜ P: The noise in the model comes from the random supply
of equities per capita ˜ Z, which is also normally distributed.4 The noise ensures that the
market price is only partially revealing. Thus, incompletely informed traders face a signal
extraction problem due to the fact that prices are not a suﬃcient statistic for all signals in
the market. If the prices where fully revealing there wouldn’t be any incentive to gather
4This assumption is equivalent to impose that a fraction of the population are noisy traders
4information.
The private signal of individual i is given by ˜ Yi = ˜ F + Mi ¢ ˜ "i; i 2 ∆ [ Φ; and Mi an
n£n diagonal matrix, where ˜ "i and ˜ F are independent and ˜ "i has mean zero and should be
independent of ˜ "k; k 6= i. I assume that signals are weakened, i.e., that on average experience
a loss in precision due to the distance between the market and the origin of the investor. This
fact should be interpreted as consistent with a standard deviation of signals that increases
linearly with some factor di; that I will call fading. This is equivalent to imposing that for
individual ± 2 ∆ and her twin image ' 2 Φ the error terms in their signals, ˜ "± and ˜ "'; should
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In the matrix M±, the coeﬃcients dj > 1; j = (m + 1);:::;n correspond to the diﬀerent
fading that faces the domestic investor in the signals of the foreign assets. Analogously, in
the matrix M', the coeﬃcients dk > 1; k = 1;:::;m correspond to the fading that the foreign
investor faces in the signals of domestic assets.
Note that the model does not require that an agent in the domestic country and her twin
in the foreign country should receive the same signal realization. The model states that on
average a domestic investor will perceive a foreign equity’s signal with a loss of precision in
comparison with a foreign investor. By the same token on average a foreign investor will
perceive a domestic equity’s signal with a loss of precision compared with a domestic investor.
It is important to note that this formulation does allow foreigners to be in some cases better
informed (conditional on the signal realization) than their domestic twins. Moreover, the
model allows diﬀerently distributed signals for each investor in each country, and diﬀerent
fading coeﬃcients between investors.
The variance covariance matrices of ˜ Z; ˜ F;Mi˜ "i are given by U;V and Si; and are assumed
to be positive deﬁnite. Henceforth, and in a slight abuse of terminology I will refer the matrix
S as the error’s covariance matrix.
The following deﬁnitions are standard in the context of noisy rational expectation models:
Deﬁnition 1 Let’s consider ( ˜ Xi)i2[0;1] a process of independent random variables with equal










0 ( ˜ Xi ¡ E(Xi))di +
R 1
0 E(Xi)di and due to the law of large numbers the term
R 1
0 ( ˜ Xi ¡ E(Xi))di is zero. This
deﬁnition will allow us to identify aggregates with expected values. So whenever we take the
a priori expected value (let’s say for example, the diﬀerence in the demands of two individuals
in an economy in which all agents have the same risk aversion ) it will correspond also to
the aggregate value. 5
Deﬁnition 2 A rational expectations equilibrium for the inﬁnite economy is a price vector
˜ P and allocation functions Di( ˜ P; ˜ Yi)i2[0;1] such that:
(a) ˜ P is( ˜ F; ˜ Z)measurable;
(b) Di( ˜ P; ˜ Yi) 2 argmaxDiE(ui( ˜ W1;i)j ˜ P; ˜ Yi);
(c)
R 1
0 Di( ˜ P; ˜ Yi)di = ˜ Z almost surely.
From Corollary 3.4 of Admati (1985) the demands for equities are given by the equation:
Di(˜ Yi; ˜ P) = G0i + G1i˜ Yi ¡ G2i ˜ P (1)
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f ); where h indexes the domestic population
and f the foreign population.
and A2 = 1
R(¯ ½V ¡1 + ¯ ½QU¡1Q+Q)¡1(I + ¯ ½QU¡1) with ¯ ½ the average risk aversion in the
global economy.
Therefore, we can rewrite the demand of individual i as follows:
E[Di] = ½ ¢ S
¡1
i ( ¯ F ¡ R ¯ P) + K(V;Q;U; ¯ Z) (2)
In what follows, I will call K(V;Q;U;Z) baseline level and, S
¡1
i ( ¯ F ¡ R ¯ P) informational
eﬀect.
In order to explain the home equity bias one needs to analyze the diﬀerence in the
demands of the domestic and foreign investors. Therefore, I will compare the demand of a
5This is because the random variables have the same mean.
6given domestic investor with the demand of her mirror image in the foreign country. Thus,
the discussion in the following section up to the simulations will only analyze the existence of
the bias on the demands of these two individuals. Consequently, it seems to be appropriate
to consider that the impact of the changes on the demands (due to fading) of these two
investors have zero impact on prices. Moreover, the impact of the changes in the demands of
two individuals will not have an impact on the clearing market condition; this will happen
because this condition can be expressed as
R 1
0 Di( ˜ P; ˜ Yi)di = ˜ Z almost surely and these
changes in demands have measure zero. However, if we analyze the impact of changes in
fading for the case of a common informational eﬀect for all the investors in a given country
there will be changes in prices and on the baseline level so that the clearing market condition
holds. In section 3, simulations will consider the overall impact of the informational structure
on the prices given a common informational structure among investors of each country.
As will be noted, the results in the following sections will depend on whether the excess
return of the assets is positive or negative. In what follows I only consider the case in which
all excess returns are positive. The reader should reverse the conclusions for the case in
which all assets present negative excess returns.
3.1 One Foreign Asset and One Domestic Asset.
In this section I study the role of asymmetries of information for the case of one domestic
and one foreign asset. The loss of precision in the signals between the origin of the signal
and the origin of the investor does not need to be symmetric.
Because there is one foreign asset and one domestic asset and two diﬀerent possible levels
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¶
First, I must identify the terms in the demands for equities that depend on the origin
of the investor. It is straightforward to note that G1i depends totally on the origin of the
investor through the matrix S
¡1
i . While for G2i note that the only term that depends on





correspond to the average inverse matrix of the signal’s covariance matrix.
7the origin of the investor is (S
¡1
i ): Therefore, the impact that signals have on demand is the
opposite to that of prices.
Thus the net eﬀect of the weakening in the signal on the demand for equities depends on
the excess of return as follows:
½iS
¡1
i ˜ Y ¡ ½iRS
¡1
i ˜ P = ½iS
¡1
i (˜ Y ¡ R ˜ P)
Next, use the superscripts d;f in order to denote the vector components related to each
type of equity, and the subscripts to identify the origin of the investor. Finally, the expected
diﬀerence in the demands for domestic and foreign equity between a domestic investor and



















































with D = S11S22 ¡ S12S21:
Note that, as intuition suggests, the diﬀerence in the demands between domestic and
foreign investors is originated solely in the asymmetries of information.
If the covariance between the signals’ errors is zero, the home equity bias for assets with
positive excess of return is obtained. The same happens if d1 = d2. I must note that Gehrig
(1993) assumes zero covariance between the signals’ errors and equal fading among assets
ensuring in this way the existence of the home bias on the demands of these two individuals.
However, as will be shown this result is not as general as suggested.
Note that if the fading coeﬃcient were proportional to the distance between the origin
of the investor and the origin of the asset, one would obtain the traditional gravitational
model for the diﬀerence in the expected demands for assets.7 Now, for the more general case
in which fading is diﬀerent for diﬀerent assets d1 > d2 the home equity is reinforced for the
case of the foreign equity, but is weakened for the domestic equity when S21 is greater than
zero. The opposite happens when S21 is smaller than zero.
The intuition of this result can be derived by assuming that the two assets have the
same positive excess of return and that their signals’ errors covary positively. If d1 > d2 it
is harder to get signals of good quality regarding domestic equity for foreign investors than
for domestic ones. Domestic investors and foreign investors will tend to buy less of each
equity, as indicated by the second terms in the diﬀerence in the demand for the domestic
7This assumption would imply d1 = d2
8equity and the ﬁrst term for the foreign equity.8 Due to the fading in the signals, domestic
investors will perceive a larger positive correlation between assets than that perceived by
foreigners, and will buy less of the domestic equity than the foreigners, thereby inducing a
less pronounced home bias for the domestic asset. Regarding the foreign asset, an analogous
result is obtained in which domestic investors perceive again a greater correlation between
signals’ errors. Thus, they buy more of the foreign asset, increasing the home bias for the
foreign asset.
Finally, if the signals’ errors covary negatively, the home bias is increased in the case of
the domestic equity but decreases in the case of foreign equity. The fact that S12 is smaller
than zero increases the demands for both assets. Due to the larger fading that foreign
investors face, they do not perceive both assets as good hedges like foreigners do, so foreign
investors increase their demand for both assets to a lesser extent. This implies that the bias
is increased for the domestic equity but decreases for the foreign.
Note that the assumption that d1 and d2 are diﬀerent must not be disregarded as a
peculiarity. Indeed, it is likely to be the case that an investor from a third world country
can follow more closely the American economy than non-sophisticated Americans can follow
a third world economy in which there is less information readily available.
Next, assume that d2 = 1; and note now that the diﬀerence in the demands for the
foreign equity just depends on the covariance term. Thus, if the covariance is greater than
zero there exists a home bias reversal in which domestic investors buy more of the foreign
equity than foreigners do. Therefore, for the case in which domestic and foreign investors
face diﬀerent fading levels and the covariance between signals’ errors is diﬀerent from zero,
asymmetric information is not merely consistent with home bias but also with its reversal.
In the next subsection I generalize this result and provide further intuition.
In the next section I study whether zero covariance between signals’ errors or equal fading
among assets are suﬃcient conditions for explaining the home equity bias.
3.2 Two Foreign Assets and One Domestic
As an intermediate step towards a more general conclusion, I consider one domestic asset
and two foreign assets. As before I assume that each asset has its own and particular level
of fading in its signal.
8If we analyze the impact of changes in fading for the case of a common informational eﬀect for all the
investors in a given country there will be changes in prices and on the baseline level so that the clearing
market condition holds.
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I use the superscripts d;fi in order to denote the vector components related to each type
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+(S12S31 ¡ S11S32)(F f1 ¡ RP f1)( 1
d2d3 ¡ 1)+





with D = S11S22S33 ¡ S11S23S32 ¡ S21S12S33 + S21S13S32 + S31S12S23 ¡ S31S13S22
In the next subsections I study three cases with three diﬀerent set of assumptions in order
to ﬁnd out whether there are conditions under which asymmetries of information explain
the home bias. These set of assumptions covers all possible informational structures.
3.2.1 Zero Covariance Between Signals’ Errors
I now analyze the simplest case. To begin, assume that the covariances between the signals’










































In this case, there exists a home bias for the three equities as long as the excess returns
are positive. Note that the expected diﬀerences for each equity also depend on the variance
of the asset and the fading coeﬃcient on the signals associated with each asset. Thus the
larger the variance of the asset the larger the bias. In the same manner the larger the
fading coeﬃcient the larger the bias. As in the case for two assets, if the fading coeﬃcient
is proportional to the distance between the origin of the investor and the origin of the asset,
I recover the traditional gravitational model for the diﬀerence in the expected demands for
assets. So in short, zero covariance between signals’ errors does guarantee the home equity
bias.
3.2.2 Uncorrelated Signals’ Errors Between Domestic and Foreign Assets
As a second exploration into the suﬃcient conditions that guarantee the home bias, assume
now that the correlation between the domestic and the foreign equities’ signals’ errors is zero.
This implies that S12 = S21 = S13 = S31 = 0. For the sake of simplicity I also assume that































With D = 1 ¡ r2
23, I recover directly the home bias for a domestic equity with positive
excess return.
On the other hand I can rewrite the expected diﬀerence in the demands for the ﬁrst of























So home bias is recovered for the ﬁrst foreign equity whenever S23 is smaller than zero,
given positive excess return. Suppose for now that d2 = 1 so that the sign of the bias
depends totally on the sign of S23: For the case S23 > 0 foreign investors want to diversify
11their portfolios and want to buy less of the foreign equities.9 However, because of the fading
in the signals, domestic investors perceive a weaker covariance in the signal’s error than the
actual one. Therefore, they tend to reduce to a lesser extent their purchases of the ﬁrst of
the foreign equities generating a home equity bias reversal, in which domestic investors buy
more of the foreign equity. For the case S23 < 0; foreign investors want to diversify their
portfolios, buying more of both foreign assets. Because of the fading in the signals, domestic
investors perceive a weaker covariance and tend to buy less, in relative terms, of the foreign
equity. In this manner the traditional home bias exists for the ﬁrst of the foreign equities.
By the same token, rewrite the expected diﬀerence in the demands for the second of the
foreign equity (equation (7)) as follows:
9The fact that S23 < 0 implies a higher demand for both assets may not be straightforward and intuitive.
So let’s illustrate this fact with an example. Let’s take:
Y1 = F1 + ²1
Y2 = F2 + ²2






























Therefore for the portfolio Wt+1 = Wt + Wt(x1Y1 + x2Y2) has mean and variance given by E[Wt + Wt ¢
























For a consumer with CARA utility function this maximization problem can be expressed as follows:
Maxx1;x2E[U(W0)] where E[U(W0)] =
R 1
¡1 ¡exp(¡½W0) ¢ f(W0)dW0 = ¡exp(½(E[W0] ¡
½
2V ar[W0]))
Therefore, the problem reduces to maximize the certainty equivalent but under this setup this is equal to
solve the CAPM model. And we know the CAPM model demands for assets can be expressed as follows:
















































Therefore, conditional on diversiﬁcation (this is minimizing the variance of the portfolio as the CAPM does)
the demands for each one of the assets is increasing on the covariance between the errors when the covariance























The home bias exists for the second of the foreign equity whenever S23 is smaller than zero.
If S23 is greater than zero there will be home bias whenever S32(F f1 ¡ RP f1)(¡ 1
d2d3 + 1) <
(F f2 ¡ RP f2)(¡ 1
d2
3 + 1): The term that depends on S32 has the same interpretation as the
one that was provided in the previous paragraph.
3.2.3 Equal Fading Among Assets
Now analyze the more general case in which the signals’ errors covary and the fading of all
assets are equal, i.e., d1 = d2 = d3 = d: Under these circumstances it is straightforward to
note that for the domestic asset the bias will always exist given that:
(S22S33 ¡ S23S32)(F
d ¡ RP
d) > 0 (17)




















Now analyze the case in which S11 = S22 = S33 = 1; the covariance S13 is close to one and
S21 = 0: It can be noted that the ﬁrst term of the last inequality will be arbitrarily small,
while that the second term will be ¡(S23)(F f2 ¡RP f2): Thus, if S23 is smaller than zero the
home bias will be recovered, while if S23 is greater than zero a bias reversal will happen.

















f1) ¡ (S11S22 ¡ S21S12)(F
f2 ¡ RP
f2) < 0 (21)
13Thus, under the same conditions of the analysis carried out for the ﬁrst foreign equity, it
can be noted that if S32 is smaller than zero we recover the home bias, while if S23 is greater
than zero the bias reversal can not be ensured, depending on the relation of the excess of
return.
In summary, information can either increase or decrease the demand for assets. When
asymmetries of information are considered, it is clear that the home equity bias will arise
whenever the role of information is to increase the demand for assets. For the case of the
foreign asset, domestic investors face a lack of precision in their signals compared with the
foreign investors. However, in this case the lack of precision does not change the nature of
the role played by information. Thus information will increase the demand for assets for both
types of investors. The diﬀerence arises in the magnitude of the increase in the demands. As
intuition suggests, domestic investors will demand the foreign equity to a lesser extent. On
the other hand, when information decreases the demand for assets, the lack of precision will
reduce the domestic investors’ demand for assets to a lesser extend generating home equity
bias reversals in the demand for foreign equity.
3.3 Interpretation
From the previous section it should be clear that the simplest case for grasping some intuition
corresponds to the common fading case. Therefore, the following results will apply to this
case.10 Inspired in the demand for assets derived from the CAPM I deﬁne informational
good and bad hedges.11
Deﬁnition 3 Good Informational Hedge: those assets for which informational eﬀect in-




i ]rowj ¢ (F ¡ RP) > 0 (22)
Deﬁnition 4 Bad Informational Hedge: those assets for which informational eﬀect de-
creases their demands over the baseline level. This is for individual i and asset j it holds
10This result can be generalized to the case of multiples fadings in which d1 > d2, d1 > d3. For the
complementary case this set of results does not generalize.
11The demand for Assets in the CAPM model is given by:
Â = ½¡1 ¢ Ω¡1 ¢ r
with Ω the returns covariance matrix. In our case:
E[Di] = ½ ¢ S
¡1
i (F ¡ RP) + K(V;Q;U;Z) with K(V,Q,U,Z) the baseline level of demand. Furthermore,








i ]rowj ¢ (F ¡ RP) < 0 (23)
From the previous subsection it is clear that the following result will hold:
Proposition 1 Assets that are good informational hedges will show home bias, while those
assets that are bad informational hedges will show home bias reversals.
The intuition underlaying the proposition is that the fading will smooth the perceptions
of domestic and foreign investors. Let’s take the case of a domestic investor considering
buying a foreign asset. For the case of a good informational hedge, the domestic investor
will perceive it as less of a good hedge than foreign investors, demanding less of it as a result.
For the case of a bad informational hedge, the domestic investor will perceive it as less of a
bad hedge than foreign investors, demanding more of it as a result.
3.4 Simulations
So far I have analyzed from a theoretical point of view the implications of asymmetric
information on the home equity bias in the demands of two individuals. In this section, I
illustrate the possibility of the home equity bias reversals implementing simulations of the
model.
The theoretical approach considered the impact of asymmetries of information on the
individual demands for a pair of agents, holding prices constant. The simulations will con-
sider the impact of the asymmetries of information on the price of the assets as well. To this
end, I assume that all agents in each country face the same informational eﬀect (they have
a common matrix Si). Each agent faces the fading in the signals related to their respective
foreign equities.
By using Deﬁnition 1 we obtain that the diﬀerence in the aggregate demands for assets




f )¢( ¯ F ¡R ¯ P) where ¯ ½ corresponds
to the average risk aversion in the global economy.
Following Admati (1985), I will consider that the excess return for the assets can be
expressed as (F ¡ RP) = (¯ ½V ¡1 + ¯ ½QU¡1Q + Q)¡1Z; where the matrix Q captures the
aggregate informational structure of the model.
The simulations will ﬁrst illustrate the impact of diﬀerent fading levels on the second
foreign asset’s signal, ﬁxing the level of fading of the domestic and the ﬁrst foreign equity
at 1. This is done in order to isolate the impact of asymmetric information of one asset on
each one of the demands, thus facilitating the analysis.







































The risk aversion coeﬃcient is 1. The value of the matrices and vectors were selected
so that the initial shares of the portfolios of the domestic and foreign investors allocated on
their own home equities were 50%.
First we must note is that despite the fact the analysis primarily focus on the impact of
changes on the fading of the second foreign asset, there will be changes in prices and demands
for the ﬁrst of the foreign assets. However, the price and the demand for the domestic
asset will remain constant as intuition suggest for the case of symmetric information. The
diﬀerence in the demands for the domestic asset is expressed in equation (5). The fact that
d1 is equal to one cancels the ﬁrst term that is due to the symmetric information on the ﬁrst
asset, while the second and third term are zero due to the fact that S12 and S13 are zero.
This implies that the contribution of the variance of the foreign assets to the demand for
the domestic asset is zero. If there are no changes in demands there will be no changes in
prices.
Fading in the signal of the second foreign equity shifts the demand of the domestic
country towards the ﬁrst foreign equity, decreasing the demand for the second foreign equity.
Regarding the foreign demand, there is an increase in the demand for the second equity and
a decrease in the demand for the ﬁrst foreign equity. The previous changes in demand give
origin to home bias in the case of the second foreign equity and a home bias reversal for the
case of the ﬁrst foreign equity. The intuition behind the reversal phenomena for a given level
fading is that both foreign equities signals’ errors are positively correlated so information
diminishes the demands of both types of investors (see equation (13)). For a given level of
fading, domestic investors perceive a lower correlation on the errors than foreign investors
do. This leads domestic investors to diminish their demand for the equity less than foreigners
do, causing in this way a bias reversal. Consistent with this fact, domestic investors demand
increases with the fading, while the demand of foreign investors decrease; this generates an
increase in the reversal given an increase in the fading. Figure 1 shows the bias and its
16Figure 1: Home Equity Bias and its reversal
reversal.
According to the changes in the domestic and foreign demands for the two foreign assets
we observe an increase in the price of the ﬁrst foreign equity and a decrease in the price of the
second foreign equity. These results are consistent with the intuition that worse information
may reduce the price of some assets. Figure 2 shows the price dependence on the level of
fading.
According to the previous behavior of demands and prices it is possible to analyze the
changes that experience the share of the investors’ portfolio allocated to home equity, Hi;






















As I mentioned before, the price and the demands for the domestic asset remain constant
despite the changes on the fading of the second foreign asset. This elicits the fact that
changes on Hd will be obtained as a consequence of changes in the portfolio shares allocated
into the ﬁrst and the second foreign assets. We already know there is an increase in demand
of the domestic country for the ﬁrst foreign equity and a decrease in the demand for the
second foreign equity. This together with the fact that the price of the ﬁrst foreign equity
17Figure 2: Equity Prices and Asymmetric Information
decreases and then increases and the price of the second foreign equity decreases, will imply
an initial increase in Hd and then a decrease. That is, Hd initially increases because the value
of the portfolio allocated in both foreign assets decreases. Then Hd decreases because the
value of the portfolio allocated on the ﬁrst foreign equity increases faster than the decrease
in the value of the portfolio allocated on the second foreign asset.
Given that the foreign demand for the second equity increases, the demand for the ﬁrst
foreign equity decreases, and that the price of the ﬁrst foreign equity increase and the price
of the second foreign equity decreases, Hf will ﬁrst decrease as the value of the portfolio
allocated in both foreign equities decrease and will then increase as the foreign investor’s
portfolio concentrates in the second foreign equity. Figure 3 shows the behavior of Hd and
Hf.
The simulation exercise shows us that once we consider the impact of the fading into assets
prices the main predictions derived in the ﬁrst half of this paper are still valid. Therefore,
asymmetries of information are not a consistent explanation for the home bias puzzle.
18Figure 3: Country Home Bias and its reversal
4 Conclusion
Contradicting conventional wisdom, this paper shows that asymmetries of information can
not explain the existence of the home equity bias. The asymmetries of information can only
guarantee the home equity bias when all assets signals’ errors are uncorrelated among them.
The model presented in the paper also predicts the existence of home equity bias reversals as
a consequence of asymmetries of information. These results show that although asymmetric
information may be one of the phenomena lying behind the home bias, it is not enough to
explain it by itself.
The results shown in this paper invite a reexamination the existing empirical evidence.
Part of this evidence postulates that distance proxies some information costs, and that
the number of phone calls and number of bank branches would account for the eﬀect of
informational asymmetries. Based on the results of this paper and in light of the work
of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000), these variables seem to be good proxies for transport costs
between countries, which under plausible assumptions are enough for generating a very high
and realistic level of home portfolio bias.
Further research is needed to address the evidence that shows that size of the ﬁrms or
the existence of ADR’s matter for foreign ownership. Most likely these issues should be
19addressed on the grounds of corporate ﬁnance.
Finally, if information acquisition costs and asymmetries of information were one of the
explanations for the home bias, further theoretical research should be needed to address
these issues with a novel approach.
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